Robert Conquest, author of
The Harvest of Sorrow, has stated that the famine of 1932–33 was a deliberate act of
mass murder, if not genocide.
[89] R. W. Davies and
Stephen G. Wheatcroft believe that if industrialisation had been abandoned, the famine could have been "prevented" or at least significantly alleviated. They see the leadership under Stalin as making significant errors in planning for the industrialisation of agriculture:
[W]e regard the policy of rapid industrialisation as an underlying cause of the agricultural troubles of the early 1930s, and we do not believe that the Chinese or NEP versions of industrialisation were viable in Soviet national and international circumstances.
[90]:626
Michael Ellman argues that, in addition to
deportations, internment in the Gulag camps and shootings (see the
law of spikelets), there is evidence that Stalin used starvation as a weapon in his war against the peasantry.
[91] He analyses the actions of the Soviet authorities, two of commission and one of omission: (i) exporting 1.8 million tonnes of grain during the mass starvation (enough to feed more than five million people for one year), (ii) preventing migration from famine afflicted areas (which may have cost an estimated 150,000 lives) and (iii) making no effort to secure grain assistance from abroad (which caused an estimated 1.5 million excess deaths), as well as the attitude of the Stalinist regime in 1932–33 that many of those starving to death were "
counter-revolutionaries", "idlers" or "thieves" who fully deserved their fate.