Technology28.10.2005

PRICING TELECOMS RIGHT

The Telecommunications Pricing Colloquium held in the context of government’s 6% growth target focused on the negative consequences of high telecom prices for business, foreign investment and employment.

The recommendations of the working group set up at the previous colloquium of the department of communications in July included greater competition, unbundling of the local loop and declaring aspects of the undersea cable an essential facility to reduce international bandwidth costs.

If just these were rapidly implemented, prices would likely fall.

But will they be implemented? Absent from the discussion document appeared to be the linkages between these remedies and the policy and regulatory framework, the market design and the current price of wholesale and retail services and, importantly, the proposed sector legal framework before parliament.

High prices are a symptom of systemic failure. They are a response to the perverse incentives for the incumbent to behave anticompetitively as a result of the market structure. They are also a symptom of the institutional failure delaying the licensing of further network competitors. This has left intact the protected, vertically integrated incumbent, whose monopolistic behaviour has had a chilling effect on the partially competitive enhanced services segment of the market and on the penetration of fixed voice and Internet services.

The implications of this for economic growth are significant, since the positive multipliers associated with “infostructure” development kick in only when a critical mass of around 40% take-up is attained.

But even if the limited network competition through the mobile segment of the market, together with a second network operator and the underserviced area licensees, had been implemented on schedule, significant price reductions would have been unlikely.

Though the threat of competition can temporarily drive down prices, improve service quality and prompt innovation, the failure of duopolies to do so is well documented. Both the fixed and mobile telecom markets in SA are in effect duopolies. Prices are not driven down under the imperfect market conditions that characterise duopolies, especially in infrastructure industries where new entrants are also dependent on the access network of incumbent operators.

This has been experienced in liberalising markets all over the world: hence the establishment of autonomous regulators, who, in the interests of consumers, navigate a path for new entrants into markets with natural monopolies or even artificial bottlenecks.

If regulators are to ensure effective competition, or make legitimate pricing interventions, they require the financial resources, information-gathering capacity, analytical skills and instruments of control to regulate highly imperfect markets effectively.

Without these, it is doubtful whether the structural independence necessary for market liberalisation is desirable. Though unregulated market failure in open access markets may result in cherry-picking, ownership concentration and cartels, policy and regulatory failure through inappropriate intervention could collapse or retard an entire sector.

The Independent Communications Authority of SA (Icasa) has acknowledged it does not have the resources and powers needed to carry out effective retail and access regulation in relation to the dominant players. This is reflected in the colloquium working group’s recommendation that the regulator be strengthened through increased funding. But funding is only the means to the ends.

How do the remedies proposed relate to the Convergence Bill and Icasa Bill now before parliament? Are there provisions in them intended to unleash the lever of competition? Can the huge task of unbundling the local loop and self-provisioning — by Vans and underserviced communities themselves — be done through policy directives alone? Or is a fundamental new policy vision required to raise the sector to a level of efficiency required to grow the economy at 6% a year?

And if these remedies are implemented, how will the beleaguered regulator be enabled to work? If adopted in its current form, the Icasa Bill will compound the structural conflict of interests faced by the ministry and undermine the regulator’s legitimacy.

Without placing the pricing issue in this context, the causes will remain opaque and the solutions elusive.

Inet-Bridge || Discuss this article

Show comments

Latest news

More news

Trending news

Poll

Which company do you trust the most for an ERP system?

View Results

Loading ... Loading ...
Sign up to the MyBroadband newsletter