The Court held that this automatic loss of citizenship brought about by the impugned provision is a form of deprivation in contravention of the fundamental right contained in section 20 of the Constitution. Insofar as the Act is the legislation contemplated in section 3(3) of the Constitution, it cannot subvert other rights contained in the Constitution and must conform with the Bill of Rights. The right to citizenship is entrenched in the Bill of Rights and, in terms of section 36, cannot be infringed upon or limited without justification. Any active removal of citizenship is on the face an infringement that requires justification in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution.
The Court then considered whether the defences raised by the respondents were sufficient to justify the limitation under section 36(1) of the Constitution. The Court emphasised that the limitation of the right to citizenship by the impugned provision served no legitimate government purpose. Save for arguing that the state has a right to regulate the acquisition and loss of citizenship, which is what, according to the state, the impugned provision lawfully does, no other legitimate purpose was advanced. The rationale behind the legislation remains unexplained. In the case of the impugned provision, there was no link between the adopted means and a legitimate government purpose. Further, the second defence put forth by the respondents was not a defence at all. The existence of a ministerial power to exercise discretion in terms of section 6(2) to alter what was otherwise an automatic loss of citizenship was no answer to the question of why citizenship must be lost in the first place.