Kindly read the quotes from Carnap at #66. Would you not agree with what he says? If not, why not?
My claim, while possibly philosophical, is physical, not metaphysical. What are "my" constructs?
Let's see:
Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935): Chap. "The Rejection of Metaphysics"
Carnap didn't like metaphysics, more specifically, he rejects any philosophical theses that "are deprived of empirical content". Or, to put it differently, he rejects any assertion of the Reality of the physical world that is deprived of empirical content.
For example, this applies to "philosophical questions of Reality, e.g. the Reality of other minds, the Reality of the given, the Reality of universals, the Reality of qualities, the Reality of relations, the Reality of numbers, etc.".
He continues:
"If any philosophical thesis answering any of these questions positively or negatively is added to the system of scientific hypotheses, this system will not in the least become more effective; we shall not be able to make any further prediction as to future experiences. Thus all these philosophical theses are deprived of empirical content, of theoretical sense; they are pseudo-theses."
So any metaphysics is just a pseudo-thesis. He would rather like to promote "Logical Analysis" as the only proper task of Philosophy. What is "Logical Analysis"?
Carnap agrees with Hume that any abstract reasoning that does not concern itself with quantity or number or any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence should be discarded.
Carnap writes:
"We agree with this view of Hume, which says - translated into our terminology - that only the propositions of mathematics and empirical science have sense, and that all other propositions are without sense."
But old Carnap then quickly runs into a bit of a problem, a
reductio ad absurdum if you want.
His own theses, that of "Logical Analysis" is neither mathematical nor empirical. It isn't verifiable. It turns out to be a metaphysical thesis itself (according to his view of metaphysics anyway). Wittgenstein's answer of "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" isn't the answer for Carnap, but he doesn't provide any answer to the objection that his own theses turns out to be without sense.
You appear to be in the same boat. You make the assertion that there is no purpose. It is a philosophical thesis that is "deprived of empirical content". It is a philosophical answer to the Reality of the given. There is no scientific hypothesis about purpose/teleology. Your assertion is a philosophical thesis answering the question of purpose negatively and is added to the system of scientific hypotheses. Carnap would have laughed at you and called it a pseudo-thesis. Irony at its best.
Yet, here you are, using Carnap's self-refuting logical positivism to support your own self-refuting views which would have been rejected by Carnap himself anyway. You must think two wrongs make a right, or two self-refuting views turn into a logical view.
Next time you claim "there is no purpose" or "reality just is" and try to use Carnap to argue against metaphysics, read what he actually wrote and understand why your claims about reality does not mix with Carnap anyway.
If there is at least one use of metaphysics, it is there to point out the silly metaphysics of others.