Unhappy438
Honorary Master
- Joined
- May 25, 2011
- Messages
- 24,915
Did you watch the video?
America does not arm ISIS. False propaganda there.
The fact that they have some American weapons is pretty expected. America are the biggest arms dealers in the world. They sell to most countries and it is easy to get your hands on those type of weapons.
I do not trust any of the rebels, I would rather throw my lot in with Assad. they are all a bunch of nut jobs and the us always making things worse by arming it's enemies.
The us has not made one good decision in the mid east, and probably never will.
Assad is also a nutjob, they are all nutjobs.
The US doesnt understand the middle east properly, hard to establish order in place where so many people are embroiled in Wahhabism.
I always thought that the USA knew exactly what it was doing in the mid east, the end goals are murky but it seems to be total destabilization of the middle east.
The killing of leaders, that have given the place relative peace during the years and war away for civilians were not just captured but killed. This leads on a road of no return, the people who pledged allegiance to X leader splinter and fight and eventually it all leads to ruin.
I have to think once assad is gone, which country is next? Saudi arabia? yemen? being a US ally means nothing in this modern day and age...
I do not trust any of the rebels, I would rather throw my lot in with Assad. they are all a bunch of nut jobs and the us always making things worse by arming it's enemies.
The us has not made one good decision in the mid east, and probably never will.
Cross post for snoop dog http://mybroadband.co.za/vb/showthr...in-Ukraine?p=12852379&viewfull=1#post12852379
USA funding Syrian rebels to fight ISIS, skip to 7.20 if you dont want to watch it all.
[video=youtube;9Cb3OURdl3g]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Cb3OURdl3g[/video]
Hindsight tells us that Assad and Hussein were better for the Middle East than ''freedom''.
America does not arm ISIS. False propaganda there.
The fact that they have some American weapons is pretty expected. America are the biggest arms dealers in the world. They sell to most countries and it is easy to get your hands on those type of weapons.
So, USA arms Syrian rebels. FACT. They cross over into Iraq with "said" weaponry and your logic is that USA did not arm them.
ghoti please tell me how this is so not Afghanistan all over again?
The Arab Spring: Why the Syrian Revolution taking very long time?
The Arab Spring started three years ago when Mohammad Bouazizi set himself on fire, signifying in his action that the Arab people had had enough of the humiliation, mortification and corruption of the dictators ruling them since independence.
A policewoman’s slap on Bouazizi’s face was the stroke that broke down fear and silence.
Revolutions of freedom started in Tunisia, spread to Egypt, knocking down two tyrant regimes in less than two months. The youth in Libya and Syria were also inspired to put an end to the long period of darkness under two of the most savage regimes in the world. They too felt they were able to break their chains and walk towards freedom.
The Libyans started off protesting peacefully as the Tunisians and Egyptians had done, but the dictator Moammar Gadhafi unleashed the army ،and began killing Libyans, turning the peaceful uprising into an armed uprising. The Libyans continued fighting while their tyrant continued killing them using whatever weapons were at his disposal and was about to win, until the international community decided, with support from the Arab League to intervene on the part of the opposition.
By the international intervention the battle was sealed in favor of the opposition in less than three months. The Gadhafi regime collapsed, he was arrested and then executed, ending the era of the so called “King of Kings”.
The Libyan experience encouraged Syrians to break their barrier of fear, which had been reinforced by the arrest, torture and killings in the brutal government repression of an uprising in Hama in the 1980s.
The fall of Gadhafi gave the Syrians hope they wouldn't be facing the nastiest monster on their own, and that the international community and their Arab friends, who stood beside the Lybians and used force to overthrow a regime that’s no less brutal than theirs, would not leave them alone in their own battle.But unfortunetly they were left .
The disappointment on the part of the Syrians has only deepened their tragedy, and led to serious distortions of their revolution. They put up with all the killing, arrests and torture, insisting on the peaceful nature of their revolution, for the first six months, as the tyrant himself has admitted. The regime, however, pushed them towards arming from the first day, with security forces detaining young demonstrators and torturing them brutally, insulting their family honor even their religious believes in a clear sectarian drive.
Those detained were released as fighters in this regime project, as I witnessed myself during 60 days of detention in the political security investigation branch with my two sons. The regime wanted to turn the revolution of freedom and dignity into a sectarian war. The rebels tried as much as they could to keep it peaceful.
However, with the indifference of the international community and the regime’s insistence on giving the uprising a sectarian dimension. By including the Lebanese and Iraqi sectarian militias and by leaking videos of the killing of protesters through torture and with a focus on specific Syrian accents used by the regime thugs and death, as well as by setting free thousands of Salafi prisoners, the regime ensured, it could no longer remain peaceful.
After a year of this battle, the soil had become fertile for extremist groups following the ideology of Al-Qaeda to overcome the authority of the Free Syrian Army. Some of those Soldiers and commanders who defected from the regime with a patriotic agenda away from extremism and sectarianism were attracted to these groups, encouraged by the support and the allegiance-buying practices......
All of this happened on front of the eyes of the regional and international intelligence agencies. There was a sequence of false promises of support for the patriotic and democratic forces that could have turned the tables in favor of the revolution and force the regime to acquiesce to a political solution that could have accomplished what more that 200,000 deaths did not. Several hundred thousand people have experienced arrest, torture, while millions were displaced inside the country and out.
All the previous leads to asking: Was it arranged for Syria to be the cemetery of the Arab Spring, fearing the spread of the protest movement to other regimes in the region? Did they want to give their people a horrible example by pushing the Syrians to this tragic destiny? Or did the Americans and the Russians want Syria to be a place they can reduce the power of Hezbollah militia, Iran and Al-Qaeda all together by putting them into a battle with each other and with a single loser, Syria the people?
The Syrians will win in the end but the price will be high, not just for them. But for The sides that are working to extend the crisis either support the tyrant or block the chances of a political solution that would put an end to the regime and maintain the unity of the land and the people. The Arab Spring may be delayed by some time but history teaches us that the people yearning to freedom will never be stopped.
http://www.english.globalarabnetwor...-syrian-revolution-taking-very-long-time.html
ISIS seen as liberators by some Sunnis in Mosul
...
Al-Monitor witnessed Iraqi soldiers on June 1 randomly firing shots in the air in the streets of Mosul, and stopping and harassing the local population.
The inhabitants of Mosul see the Iraqi army as a Shiite occupation army from Baghdad, and some civilians welcomed ISIS when they entered Mosul and removed all Iraqi army checkpoints.
Athil al-Nujaifi, governor of Ninevah province, has reportedly lobbied for local police to replace the Iraqi army in Mosul, but Baghdad maintained its military presence, which is deeply unpopular with many residents.
Sunni Arabs and Kurds from Mosul, especially, had no good words for the Iraqi army's deputy chief, Abboud Qanbar, and the head of the Ninevah Operations Command, Mahdi al-Ghrawi, suggesting they had arrested innocent civilians and were involved in corruption.
"The Iraqi army oppressed the people, they stole their money," said Ali Ahmed, a driver, who was shot while fleeing Mosul.
According to Ahmed, the local population in Mosul welcomed ISIS. "The people in Mosul do not like Daash, or Maliki, but they now feel better under Daash, and water and electricity returned."
Ahmed al-Ghadra, 74, a former resident of Mosul, told Al-Monitor the army mistreated him. "The Arab Iraqi people want Maliki to go to prison. He is a traitor. Fourteen Daash members come, and the whole Iraqi army flees. The people of Mosul do not want the Iraqi army in Mosul. I'm an old man, and they stopped me for one hour at a checkpoint, using bad language."
More witnesses confirm that ISIS treated the civilian population well, and told them that they would only punish those who work with Maliki. Basma Mohammed told Al-Monitor that the situation was horrible in Mosul. "We had no water, no food in Mosul, but now everything is back. They [ISIS] told the people to go back to Mosul."
Dr. Omar al-Faris, from Mosul, who works in the Dahuk emergency hospital, told Al-Monitor that the population welcomed ISIS because they removed all the checkpoints. "Before, it took two hours to get somewhere. Now the civilians are free to move. All of them are happy that the Iraqi army left."
Mohammed Saad Ali from Mosul, whose son was hurt in the crossfire, told Al-Monitor he is not hopeful about the future. "I do not think the Iraqi army can get Mosul back again. For 10 years there was no stability. It is in the hands of God."
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ori...sul-takeover-residents-blame-iraqi-army.html#
Ambassador Robert Ford: Arm Syria’s Opposition
In February, I resigned as the American ambassador to Syria, after 30 years’ foreign service in Africa and the Middle East. As the situation in Syria deteriorated, I found it ever harder to justify our policy. It was time for me to leave.
The media attention about my departure, however, misses the real point. What matters is that the regime of President Bashar al-Assad can drop barrel bombs on civilians and hold sham elections in parts of Damascus, but it can’t rid Syria of the terrorist groups now implanted in the ungoverned regions of eastern and central Syria.
Both Mr. Assad and the jihadists represent a challenge to the United States’ core interests. Mr. Assad heads a regime that is an affront to human decency, and his vicious tactics have caused a flood of refugees that could destabilize the region.
Al Qaeda offshoots that joined the war now pose a potential threat to our security, as the directors of national intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have warned. These extremists enjoy a sanctuary from which they may mount attacks against Europe or the United States.
Americans can be proud that we have provided over $2 billion in humanitarian aid to help Syrian refugees. But this is treating symptoms, not the disease. We must have a strategy that deals with both Mr. Assad and the jihadists.
We don’t need American airstrikes in Syria, and we certainly don’t need American troops there. But with partner countries from the Friends of Syria group like France, Britain, Germany, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, we must ramp up sharply the training and material aid provided to the moderates in the armed opposition.
Over the past two years, I met fighters from the Free Syrian Army many times. These men were not angels: Many were former regime officers; all had military experience. In a memorable meeting last November, we exchanged barbs for hours, but they made clear that they did not accept Al Qaeda’s philosophy. They acknowledged that they would ultimately have to fight Al Qaeda and the foreign jihadis.
They agreed to negotiate with the regime, while holding firm that Mr. Assad must go. Yet they doubted they could extract concessions given their current level of material support, and the talks in Geneva in January and February proved them right. The message from last week’s election is that governing Damascus and part of a failed state counts as a victory for Mr. Assad even if his prospects for vanquishing the opposition are negligible.
Some have argued that the easier course is to accept that Mr. Assad is entrenched in the capital and work with his regime to contain and eliminate the terrorist groups in Syria. This would not benefit American security.
I met Mr. Assad twice. He was suave, but three years after the peaceful protests started, his record of relying on horrific brutality to maintain power is clear. Moreover, his regime has a history of implicit cooperation with Al Qaeda, as we saw in Iraq. This is not a man with whom the United States should align itself.
Mr. Assad now depends on Iran and Hezbollah for his survival, and Iran’s influence in Syria is likely to remain as long as Mr. Assad does. Hezbollah, though, is unlikely to fight to clear eastern Syria of jihadists. None of this serves American interests.
To be sure, there is no military solution, but it is possible to salvage something in Syria by preparing the conditions for a genuine negotiation toward a new government. And that requires empowering the moderate armed opposition.
First, the Free Syrian Army needs far greater material support and training so that it can mount an effective guerrilla war. Rather than try to hold positions in towns where the regime’s air force and artillery can flatten it, the armed opposition needs help figuring out tactics to choke off government convoy traffic and overrun fixed-point defenses.
To achieve this, the Free Syrian Army must have more military hardware, including mortars and rockets to pound airfields to impede regime air supply operations and, subject to reasonable safeguards, surface-to-air missiles. Giving the armed opposition these new capabilities would jolt the Assad military’s confidence.
Even Iran would have to consider the safety of its supply flights. That caution would inform Iranian thinking and might even stir Tehran to join us in pushing for serious negotiations.
Cash for small salaries, together with reliable supplies of food, medicine and ammunition, would also put the moderate armed forces on an equal footing with the Qaeda groups that have long offered these enticements to recruit Syrian fighters. The Free Syrian Army commanders often pleaded with me for such basic items.
Boosting aid has to be part of an understanding that the opposition must make big changes, too. Most important, the sectarianism among the Syrian opposition hinders a political deal. Punishing fighters who have killed and kidnapped on a sectarian basis would help convince the weary supporters of Mr. Assad that they could trust opposition hands that reached out across the negotiating table.
The opposition leadership outside Syria must also coordinate better with the activists and fighters on the ground. I served as a diplomat in Iraq for nearly five years, and we saw there how little sway expatriate oppositionists carried.
We don’t have good choices on Syria anymore. But some are clearly worse than others. More hesitation and unwillingness to commit to enabling the moderate opposition fighters to fight more effectively both the jihadists and the regime simply hasten the day when American forces will have to intervene against Al Qaeda in Syria.
By: Robert S. Ford, a resident scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, was the United States ambassador to Syria from 2010 to 2014.
http://www.english.globalarabnetwor...sador-robert-ford-arm-syria-s-opposition.html
Friday 13 June 2014
President Barack Obama issued a stark ultimatum to Iraq’s leaders on Friday, making it clear that any US military action against advancing Islamic extremists was contingent upon Baghdad's commitment to resolving sectarian differences.
The US president said he would decided "in the days ahead" whether to launch military strikes in Iraq to help halt the progress of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis), which has swept across Sunni territory and is quickly approaching the capital.
Obama spoke from the White House after a day of further chaos in Iraq, where Isis fighters captured two towns north-east of Baghdad, and a prominent Shia called on Iraqis to take up arms. Neighbouring Iran also signalled it may enter the conflict to shore up Iraq's Shia-led government.
The president said any US military involvement, which would not involve ground troops and would not take place for several days, was destined to fail unless the Iraqi government committed to addressing the deep-rooted divisions that are threatening to tear the country apart.
“We can’t do it for them. And in the absence of this type of political effort, short-term military action, including any assistance we might provide, won’t succeed,” he said. “The United States is not simply going to involve itself in a military action in the absence of a political plan by the Iraqis that gives us some assurance that they’re prepared to work together.”
Any new military assault would likely include an air campaign, using either or both air force or navy warplanes, officials have told the Guardian. Drone strikes remain under consideration but manned aircraft are said to the preferred option, owing to their superiority against fast-moving targets.
Earlier on Friday, the Guardian revealed that the plans under consideration by the White House include air strikes on possible targets in Syria as well as Iraq. Obama said in his press conference that Isis was “a vicious organisation that has been able to take control of the chaos in Syria” and one US objective was to prevent it gaining “a broader foothold” in the region.
Obama did not provide any detail of the military action under consideration, but said any force authorised by him would be “targeted, precise”. He also made clear US military involvement was not imminent and would not include use of ground troops.
Instead, the president signalled US involvement in the conflict would only occur after further deliberation, and would first require action by Nouri al-Maliki, whose government Washington believes is at least partly responsible for the rapid descent into chaos.
He was scathing of the collapse of Iraq's military in the face of advancing extremist fighters and said the failure of the army was linked to the broader political instability in the country.
“The fact they are not willing to stand and fight and defend their posts against admittedly hardened terrorists, but not terrorists who are overwhelming in numbers, indicates that there is a problem with morale, there is a problem in terms of commitment and ultimately that is rooted in the political problems that have plagued the country for a very long time.”
He said that discussions would take place with the Iraqi government of how it could act to strengthen its security forces. “We will be getting a better sense from them of how they might support an effort to bring about the kind of agreement inside Iraq that bolsters security forces,” he said.
Obama indicated that those crucial consultations with Maliki’s government would conclude by the end of the weekend.
However, Obama, who withdrew US troops from Iraq in 2011 and has promised to do the same in Afghanistan before the end of his term, pointedly added: “This should be a wake-up call. Iraq’s leaders have to demonstrate a willingness to make hard decisions and compromises on behalf of the Iraqi people in order to bring the country together.”
The president, who made the remarks on the White House south lawn after intensive deliberations with his national security team, insisted the problem in Iraq was “not solely or even primarily a military challenge”.
He made it clear that the US was not prepared to commit military resources to Iraq unless significant reforms were pushed through.
“Any action that we may take to provide assistance to Iraqi security forces has to be joined by a serious and sincere effort by Iraq’s leaders to set aside sectarian differences, to promote stability and account for the legitimate interests of all of Iraq’s communities, and to continue to be build the capacity of an effective security force,” he said.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/13/obama-iraq-ultimatum-us-military-action
Why Iraq should consider separate Sunni and Shia regions
Sectarian violence could dominate Iraq for years, and the Kurds have shown autonomy can work
Friday 13 June 2014
The seizing of Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, by jihadists has sent shockwaves throughout the Middle East and the rest of the world. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isis), now controls or operates with impunity in territory stretching between Syria and Iraq, and will attempt to push to the south, take control of Baghdad and effectively put an end to Iraq as we know it.
But Iraq can still be saved. In the short-term the country, with the support of either regional powers such as Iran and Turkey or the broader international community, must hit back fast and hard at the Sunni north.
The Iraqis have already asked the US for air strikes. That could go a long way. It is imperative the government reassures the Iraqi people that Isis is no match for it; that Isis is not a force for the future, lest it swells its ranks with more Iraqis and expands its support bases. It must be given a bloody nose.
The military option in the short-term might empower and give moderate Sunni Arab forces a chance in the longer run, but for this to happen – and for Iraq to sustain itself – the country must accept that the notion of a centralised and unified Iraq has been a failed exercise.
The problem is essentially one of authority. The Iraqi state and its armed forces are seen as being Shia controlled, and therefore lack respect and recognition in the Sunni north. It is no coincidence that Iraq's most stable areas are those that are most homogeneous, where security and governance is in the hands of local actors seen as legitimate by a supportive local population, as in the case of the Kurdish north and the Shia south.
As the Americans did, the government has tried to rely on local tribes to stabilise Sunni Arab areas. However, they are seen as government proxies. During the course of conflict in the north, particularly in Anbar, most switched sides to fight against the state.
This week in Mosul, Iraq's Arab Sunnis effectively welcome Isis with open arms because of a sense of fear as well as widespread agitations toward the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. The continued rejection of the post-2003 Iraq by Arab Sunnis has given Isis the chance to capitalise, with maximum effect, on feelings of marginalisation among the Sunni Arab community.
Giving moderate Sunni Arab leaders the chance to self-govern within an autonomous region, if and when extremists elements such as Isis have been contained, constitutes a realistic way forward that accepts the Shia-dominated Baghdad government lacks the legitimacy and support to challenge militants for the hearts and minds of Sunni Arabs.
Regionalising Iraq into different ethno-sectarian regions has been proposed in the past. It can no longer be dismissed. Sectarian conflict is no longer identified simply as a problem that came and left with the Americans, but as an Iraqi problem that will dominate Iraq for decades to come.
Further, moderate Sunni Arab actors now welcome the idea of an autonomous region, accepting that they miscalculated when mobilising their communities to reject the new Iraq in 2003. They now hold prestigious government posts, accept the new Iraq is here to stay, and regret that it was their mobilisation of Sunnis that allowed extremists to rise.
The Kurds have proved that autonomy is not synonymous with partition. It is ironic that the Kurds, long derided by their Arab partners for making the most of their autonomy and weakening Iraq, are now its most unifying force.
The Kurdish peshmerga forces are Iraq's most organised, effective and disciplined military force and have deployed heavily in areas that separate Iraqi Kurdistan from Arab Iraqi areas currently controlled by Isis. In Syria's north-east, the Kurds have fought Isis and other Islamists with great effect and have proved they have the capacity to contain and eliminate them.
If Isis becomes too much of a threat, then the Kurds will act to protect their own population and territory. But the Kurds will not save Iraq at the expense of Kurdish interests. They suffered heavily in the past in the hands of either dictatorial or Sunni Islamist entities, and will look to avoid being dragged into a conflict that is not yet theirs to fight.
Therefore, unless Kurdistan's interests are threatened, a Kurdish intervention can take place only if the Kurds' Arab partners guarantee Kurdistan's interests in Iraq. That means giving the Kurds increased autonomy, energy rights and control over oil-rich disputed territories like Kirkuk. But the Kurds may now get all that anyway.
Control of Kirkuk takes the Kurds all the more closer to independence. The Kurds have also proved their worth by taking in more than 700,000 displaced Iraqis from Mosul. The question and litmus test for them is whether their Arab partners are ready to reciprocate.
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/13/iraq-separate-sunni-shia-regions-kurds-autonomy
The Lack of Major Wars May Be US Hurting Economic Growth
The continuing slowness of economic growth in high-income economies has prompted soul-searching among economists. They have looked to weak demand, rising inequality, Chinese competition, over-regulation, inadequate infrastructure and an exhaustion of new technological ideas as possible culprits.
An additional explanation of slow growth is now receiving attention, however. It is the persistence and expectation of peace.
The world just hasn’t had that much warfare lately, at least not by historical standards. Some of the recent headlines about Iraq or South Sudan make our world sound like a very bloody place, but today’s casualties pale in light of the tens of millions of people killed in the two world wars in the first half of the 20th century. Even the Vietnam War had many more deaths than any recent war involving an affluent country.
Counterintuitive though it may sound, the greater peacefulness of the world may make the attainment of higher rates of economic growth less urgent and thus less likely. This view does not claim that fighting wars improves economies, as of course the actual conflict brings death and destruction. The claim is also distinct from the Keynesian argument that preparing for war lifts government spending and puts people to work. Rather, the very possibility of war focuses the attention of governments on getting some basic decisions right — whether investing in science or simply liberalizing the economy. Such focus ends up improving a nation’s longer-run prospects.
It may seem repugnant to find a positive side to war in this regard, but a look at American history suggests we cannot dismiss the idea so easily. Fundamental innovations such as nuclear power, the computer and the modern aircraft were all pushed along by an American government eager to defeat the Axis powers or, later, to win the Cold War. The Internet was initially designed to help this country withstand a nuclear exchange, and Silicon Valley had its origins with military contracting, not today’s entrepreneurial social media start-ups. The Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite spurred American interest in science and technology, to the benefit of later economic growth.
War brings an urgency that governments otherwise fail to summon. For instance, the Manhattan Project took six years to produce a working atomic bomb, starting from virtually nothing, and at its peak consumed 0.4 percent of American economic output. It is hard to imagine a comparably speedy and decisive achievement these days.
As a teenager in the 1970s, I heard talk about the desirability of rebuilding the Tappan Zee Bridge. Now, a replacement is scheduled to open no earlier than 2017, at least — provided that concerns about an endangered sturgeon can be addressed. Kennedy Airport remains dysfunctional, and La Guardia is hardly cutting edge, hobbling air transit in and out of New York. The $800 billion stimulus bill, in response to the recession, has not changed this basic situation.
Today the major slow-growing Western European nations have very little fear of being taken over militarily, and thus their politicians don’t face extreme penalties for continuing stagnation. Instead, losing office often means a boost in income from speaking or consulting fees or a comfortable retirement in a pleasant vacation spot. Japan, by comparison, is faced with territorial and geopolitical pressures from China, and in response it is attempting a national revitalization through the economic policies of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Ian Morris, a professor of classics and history at Stanford, has revived the hypothesis that war is a significant factor behind economic growth in his recent book, “War! What Is it Good For? Conflict and the Progress of Civilization From Primates to Robots.” Morris considers a wide variety of cases, including the Roman Empire, the European state during its Renaissance rise and the contemporary United States. In each case there is good evidence that the desire to prepare for war spurred technological invention and also brought a higher degree of internal social order.
Another new book, Kwasi Kwarteng’s “War and Gold: A 500-Year History of Empires, Adventures, and Debt,” makes a similar argument but focuses on capital markets. Mr. Kwarteng, a Conservative member of British Parliament, argues that the need to finance wars led governments to help develop monetary and financial institutions, enabling the rise of the West. He does worry, however, that today many governments are abusing these institutions and using them to take on too much debt. (Both Mr. Kwarteng and Mr. Morris are extending themes from Azar Gat’s 820-page magnum opus, “War in Human Civilization,” published in 2006.)
Yet another investigation of the hypothesis appears in a recent working paper by the economists Chiu Yu Ko, Mark Koyama and Tuan-Hwee Sng. The paper argues that Europe evolved as more politically fragmented than China because China's risk of conquest from its western flank led it toward political centralization for purposes of defense. This centralization was useful at first but eventually held China back. The European countries invested more in technology and modernization, precisely because they were afraid of being taken over by their nearby rivals.
But here is the catch: Whatever the economic benefits of potential conflict might have been, the calculus is different today. Technologies have become much more destructive, and so a large-scale war would be a bigger disaster than before. That makes many wars less likely, which is a good thing, but it also makes economic stagnation easier to countenance.
There is a more optimistic read to all this than may first appear. Arguably the contemporary world is trading some growth in material living standards for peace — a relative paucity of war deaths and injuries, even with a kind of associated laziness.
We can prefer higher rates of economic growth and progress, even while recognizing that recent G.D.P. figures do not adequately measure all of the gains we have been enjoying. In addition to more peace, we also have a cleaner environment (along most but not all dimensions), more leisure time and a higher degree of social tolerance for minorities and formerly persecuted groups. Our more peaceful and — yes — more slacker-oriented world is in fact better than our economic measures acknowledge.
Living in a largely peaceful world with 2 percent G.D.P. growth has some big advantages that you don’t get with 4 percent growth and many more war deaths. Economic stasis may not feel very impressive, but it’s something our ancestors never quite managed to pull off. The real questions are whether we can do any better, and whether the recent prevalence of peace is a mere temporary bubble just waiting to be burst.
Tyler Cowen is a professor of economics at George Mason University. Follow him on Twitter at @tylercowen.