First, if America has learned anything about the Middle East, it is that we cannot easily insulate ourselves from its pathologies. This is not a region where the Las Vegas rules apply: what takes place in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that.
Second, even when we achieve energy independence, which should be our national aim, we have to remember that there is one pool of oil and natural gas for the world and the price will be determined internationally by what is available for all global consumers. Cut off the oil from the region or the 20 percent of the world’s daily supply that passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and the price of oil will spike dramatically.
Third, our allies will remain dependent on energy supplies from the region for the foreseeable future, and our traditional interest of not having a hostile power gain leverage over the area’s flow of oil and gas will not materially change.
Fourth, we have a longstanding commitment to Israeli security, and the emerging trends in the region—in terms of both Islamist hostility and the proliferation of missiles—are making the threat environment facing Israel more ominous than it has been since the founding of the state.
And, fifth, proliferation of missiles is bad enough; were there to be a nuclear-armed Middle East, the prospect of a nuclear war in this region would threaten global stability and well-being—and we have a huge stake in preventing that.
For all these reasons, we cannot walk away or disengage from the Middle East.
...
That longer-term vision of protecting our near-term priorities while making it possible for pluralism and secular, liberal forces to eventually emerge also has implications for how we deal with our traditional Arab friends, the conservative monarchies. At present, the monarchies, particularly the oil monarchies, are anxious about what they perceive as the administration’s impulse to accommodate the Islamists.
It is pointless to argue that the perception is unfair; there is no denying that it exists. As such, it is important for the administration to set the record straight. It should be clear that we see the Islamists neither as our natural friends nor as the wave of the future.
That said, where leaders like Egyptian president Muhammad Morsi have been legitimately elected, we will deal and be prepared to work with them. But their behavior will guide the relationship and what is possible in it. Indeed, our readiness to work with them—and even provide and mobilize assistance and investment for them—will depend on their active opposition to terror; on their fulfilling their international obligations, including those regarding peace with Israel; and on their respecting minority rights and the political right of their domestic opposition to function peacefully.
Even as the administration spells out these principles in public and private, it needs to be very clear with the Arab monarchies that we will continue to help secure them from external threats. At the same time, the administration will do our Arab friends no favors if it pretends that they are immune to the broader awakening in the region.
Increasingly, publics in the region seek to be treated as citizens with rights rather than as subjects with neither a voice nor the right to demand accountability. There is no easy blueprint for the transition, and the fear of instability—and voids filled by the Islamists—will temper how rapidly change can come.
...
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/StrategicReport12.pdf
